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Banks face two central issues regarding liquidity. Banks are 
responsible for managing liquidity creation and liquidity risk. 
Liquidity creation helps depositors and companies stay liquid, 
for companies especially when other forms of financing become 
difficult. Managing liquidity risk is to ensure the banks own 
liquidity so that the bank can continue to serve its function.  
This balancing act between a bank’s own liquidity and its role 
as a liquidity creator, especially in times of financial distress or 
crisis, is the focus of this paper. There has been a great deal of 
scrutiny on this issue due to the financial crisis that began in 
2007 and is still affecting the economy today. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The term liquidity is often used in multiple contexts. An asset’s liquidity can be used to 
describe how quickly, easily and costly it is to convert that asset into cash (Berger & 
Bouwman, 2008). Liquidity can also be used to describe a company by the amount of 
cash or near cash assets a company has; the more liquid assets, the higher a 
company’s liquidity. Financial ratios that measure liquidity are referred to as a 
company’s liquidity ratios. One such ratio is the current ratio which determines a 
company’s ability to pay short term debts as they come due (Van Ness, 2009). Liquidity 
risk has many definitions but the one that can be derived from the ratio is the probability 
that a company will not be able to pay its short term obligations as they come due. This 
inability can lead a company to face serious financial problems. In addition to this, 
liquidity risk can also be defined in terms of the counterparty to a transaction. In this 
sense the term means the risk inherent in the fact that the counterparty may not be able 
to pay or settle the transaction even if they are in good financial standing, because of a 
lack of liquidity (Petria & Petria, 2009). 
 
Liquidity risk for a bank is especially prevalent as it is easy for a bank to lose its liquidity 
because depositors can withdraw funds when they choose. In addition to depositors, 
banks face another way in which their cash reserves can be strained by fulfilling 
obligations to companies. These companies have previously established loan 
commitments, called credit lines, that can be borrowed from the bank when needed 
(Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2007). Historically, runs on banks have shown certain 
banks predisposition to liquidity risk and the severity of impact this risk can have on the 
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economy. This risk is intricately tied to the nature of banking. This is why banks, 
governmental entities, and private industry have tried to understand liquidity risk and 
implement public policy, regulations, and risk assessment policies to mitigate this risk. 
 
Aside from managing their own liquidity, banks play another role with regards to liquidity 
by creating liquidity for the market. Due to the growth of the commercial paper, equity, 
and bonds markets in recent decades, the role of banks as the sole provider of capital 
to large companies has diminished. This results from companies looking for the type of 
financing that best suits their specific needs. Banks still play a largely influential role in 
financing. They are a primary issuer of capital to companies who seek loans to fulfill a 
portion of their financing needs. Many times they act as the fall-back crutch on which 
companies support themselves in times of difficult financing. Companies can do so by 
establishing credit lines with banks to secure funding that ensures liquidity when it is 
needed most. 
 
In summary, banks face two central issues regarding liquidity. Banks are responsible for 
managing liquidity creation and liquidity risk. Liquidity creation helps depositors and 
companies stay liquid, for companies especially when other forms of financing become 
difficult. Managing liquidity risk is to ensure the bank’s own liquidity so that the bank can 
continue to serve its function.   
 
This balancing act between a bank’s own liquidity and its role as a liquidity creator, 
especially in times of financial distress or crisis, is the focus of this paper. There has 
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been a great deal of scrutiny on this issue due to the financial crisis that began in 2007 
and is still affecting the economy today. This paper compares and contrasts several of 
the ideas and theories presented in academic literature. Section II will provide a review 
of these ideas and theories presented in the literature; Section III will present the 
statement of problem; Section IV will present possible solutions and suggestions; 
Section V will conclude; Section VI will offer further research suggestions. 
II. Literature Review 
 
 
Banks own liquidity and their role as a liquidity provider are intricately connected. The 
basic relationship is that when banks require more liquidity for themselves, they are able 
to provide less liquidity to the market. Obviously this is a simplified relationship. By 
holding more liquid assets, banks decrease their liquidity risk. The holding of liquid 
assets in excess of requirements is considered a liquidity cushion or buffer which helps 
banks in times of increased liquidity pressure to meet these liquidity needs. Having a 
liquidity buffer thus lowers the amount of liquidity a bank can create for the market in 
normal times. However, as will be discussed, in times of turmoil or crisis this liquidity 
buffer can actually increase a bank’s liquidity creation as it may let these banks 
capitalize on other banks inability to lend. By creating liquidity in the market, banks 
serve an important economic role. If markets go illiquid or “dry up” this can lead to a 
decline in business growth as well as put difficult strains on consumers. This is why the 
relationship between the two has important effects on the economy and thus has 
warranted a great deal of academic attention. 
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There are many factors that affect banks own liquidity and in turn affect the amount of 
liquidity they can create. These factors have a varying degree of influence on the 
balance between liquidity risk and liquidity creation, or a bank’s liquidity management. A 
bank’s assets and liabilities play a central role in their balancing of liquidity risk and 
creation. A bank’s liabilities include all the banks sources of funds. Banks have three 
main sources of funds: deposit accounts, borrowed funds, and long term funds. The 
amounts and sources of funds clearly affect how much liquidity risk a bank has and how 
much liquidity it can create. The easier a bank can access funds the less risk it has and 
the higher amount of funds it holds the more liquidity it can create, if willing to do so. 
Deposit accounts are made up of transaction deposits, also known as demand deposits, 
savings deposits, time deposits, and money market deposit accounts. The borrowed 
funds of a bank come from loans from other banks via the Federal Funds market, loans 
from the Federal Reserve Bank, repurchase agreements, and Eurodollar borrowings. 
The longer term sources of funds for banks are bonds that banks issue and bank capital 
(Madura, 2007).  
 
One group of researchers studied liquidity management by focusing on the liability side 
of the balance sheet analyzing demand deposit accounts and the amount of undrawn 
credit lines a bank had. These two liabilities are major factors of a bank’s liquidity risk. 
Demand deposit accounts give banks a larger cash base and thus are a form of 
liquidity. Undrawn credit lines are a liquidity risk that is off the balance sheet; companies 
with established credit lines can borrow from banks when they need it and thus 
decrease a bank’s liquidity. These two opposing liquidity factors can be analyzed in 
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times of financial distress, for example by looking at the Russian default of 1998 and its 
after affects. After the Russian default a major trend unfolded: the spread between 
Treasury bill paper and commercial paper widened. This signaled investor uncertainty 
and affected demand deposit accounts and credit lines. With investors no longer 
wanting to invest in commercial paper, many entrusted their money to the banks. 
Specifically, investors put this money into demand deposit accounts believing the 
market distress would be short lived. This lead to an increase in cash reserves at banks, 
and those with more demand deposit accounts enjoyed a more significant increase in 
liquidity. However, with companies being unable to refinance their commercial paper, or 
forced to refinance at a much higher cost, these companies turned to their pre-
established lines of credit for financing. Banks with more undrawn credit lines faced 
more liquidity pressure than banks that did not have as many. The 1998 turmoil 
provides evidence for two important points. The first is that when investors are uncertain 
they tend to flock to banks as a safe haven. This in turn decreases a banks liquidity risk 
by increasing their cash on hand. The other is that in times of uncertainty companies 
also turn to banks but for the opposite reason: they need financing. This increases a 
bank’s liquidity risk but it is also how banks act as liquidity creators. Studies indicate that 
banks balance their liquidity risk and their role as a liquidity creator by balancing their 
demand deposit accounts and their amount of undrawn credit lines; banks that did so 
fared better financially (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2007).  
 
The balancing act for banks between liquidity risk and creation can also be a strategic 
decision instead of one solely to meet demands and prevent the bank from failing 
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(Acharya, Shin, & Yorulmazer, 2009). When banks face increasing liquidity risk, many 
times in the face of financial crisis or turmoil, they also face a downturn in new business. 
Banks that have the relatively same inflow of cash through increasing demand deposits 
to the outflow of cash due to fulfillment of credit lines will be unable to originate new 
loans. A strategic decision a bank can make is to hold more liquidity, or a liquidity 
cushion. In “normal” economic times, this will cause banks to miss out to some extent 
on new business. However, in tough economic times this liquidity cushion will give 
banks a competitive advantage. This is for two main reasons. One main reason is that 
banks that have higher liquidity before a crisis will be able to act as a liquidity provider 
for companies who do not have credit lines established or who need additional funding 
on top of those funds. The second is that the banks that face the most liquidity 
pressures and have more cash outflow than inflow will have to sell assets. In this 
situation most other banks will be facing increased liquidity pressures and there will be 
only a few banks in the market to buy these assets. This lack of liquidity in the market 
can lead to fire sales of assets. This means the company looking to sell the assets will 
have to offer them at a large discount because it needs the cash now due to liquidity 
pressure. Therefore, in crisis periods banks holding more liquidity will be able to both 
grow in new business and take over business of other banks by buying their assets at 
low prices. By purchasing assets at fire sale prices banks that are the purchaser stand 
to make a great deal of profit (Acharya, Shin, & Yorulmazer, 2009). An example of this 
can be found in the book Citibank, 1812-1970. The authors explain how National City 
Bank used this high liquidity strategy prior to both the crises of 1893 and 1907. This 
strategy led to significantly higher growth in new loans and in deposits (Cleveland & 
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Huertas, 1985). This means that the bank was able to increase its role as a liquidity 
provider and keep its liquidity risk constant. During the recent financial crisis a 
somewhat opposing trend played out. Even those banks that experienced an increase 
in deposits did not originate new loans and instead placed these deposits with central 
banks (Senior Supervisors Group, 2009). This meant that although they were enjoying 
an increase in liquidity, they did not want to act as liquidity creators. In essence, the 
banks wanted to stockpile their liquidity and thus reduce their liquidity risk instead of 
balancing it with liquidity creation. This was mostly due to the uncertainty surrounding 
other companies’ creditworthiness. 
  
The amount of exposure a bank has to the real or perceived cause of a financial crisis 
has a significant effect on a banks liquidity risk and creation. Banks with a higher degree 
of exposure to the cause will face increased liquidity pressure and thus will not be able 
to provide as much liquidity to the market. This relationship is evidenced by the near 
failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) after the Russian default in 1998. 
Firms that were more exposed to LTCM experienced more volatility and a greater drop 
in stock prices than those not exposed to the company (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 
2007). Although stock price is not the focus of this paper, a decrease in stock price will 
signal weakness and increase liquidity pressure on any type of company. Many liquidity 
pressures can be detailed by examining the current crisis. The degree of exposure 
companies and banks faced in the current crisis dealt with the amount of complex 
financial products, especially mortgage related products, held by the company and 
exposure to firms that came close to or actually did collapse such as Lehmann Brothers 
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and Bear Sterns. The crisis has decreased banks willingness to finance loans that use 
collateral.  This was especially true for those firms who were perceived as being weak 
because this weakness could mean being unable to collect on loans issued. Banks that 
would continue financing did so with stricter requirements. Difficult to value products 
were less likely to be allowed to be used as collateral, increased margins were required, 
shorter maturities were imposed, and a general decrease in funding transpired (Senior 
Supervisors Group, 2009). This meant that banks were much less willing to be liquidity 
providers during the crisis and if they were willing to be providers it was to a lesser 
extent.  
 
During the financial crisis the interbank lending market even experienced a significant 
decrease. Banks have typically been able to rely on other banks to meet short term 
financing shortcomings due to a lack of liquidity. Banks do this through the Federal 
Funds market. In this market, banks borrow and lend to each other at a rate roughly .25 
to 1.00 percent higher than the Treasury bill rate. The rate is influenced by whether 
there are more banks looking to lend excess funds or more banks looking to borrow 
excess funds (Madura, 2007). In the current crisis little or no banks were looking to lend 
due to their own liquidity pressure. The uncertainty of creditworthiness and exposure to 
the cause of the crisis caused banks to become hesitant to lend to other banks. The 
drying up of interbank lending again meant banks were unwilling to provide liquidity for 
fear of what it might mean for their own liquidity in the future.  
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A bank’s risk management policy evaluates: the amount of demand deposits versus 
undrawn credit lines, the strategic decision of holding higher or lower liquidity cushions, 
and companies and other banks creditworthiness, especially those more exposed to a 
crisis. Risk managers use many models to account for the level of risk they are taking 
and how this affects the firm’s profit and viability in various economic situations. Risk 
management policies can however have a spiral effect on the amount of liquidity banks 
are willing to provide. When a bank perceives itself as having higher risk, such as 
having a higher liquidity risk, it implements stricter risk management policies and will 
limit the amount of liquidity they provide. This means there will be less liquidity in the 
market. Less liquidity in the market will increase a bank’s risk management policies and 
again lead to less liquidity provided by banks (Garleanu & Pedersen, 2007). This 
feedback loop can spiral and lead to serious financing difficultly within the market.  
 
Regulations and governmental agencies can significantly influence a bank’s liquidity risk 
and its role as a liquidity provider. A factor of bank liquidity risk and creation is whether 
or not the bank is publicly traded. Being publicly traded means that a bank must file with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The filing requirements are stringent 
and include both annual and interim financial information and require financial reporting 
to be completed under specific guidelines. This means that banks which are publicly 
traded become transparent than banks that are private. Transparency is important 
because it means there is less information asymmetry between a bank’s management 
and possible lenders to the bank. Lenders are more willing to lend to a bank that has 
less information asymmetry and is publicly traded than one that has more information 
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asymmetry and is not publicly traded (Holod & Peek, 2006). This means that banks that 
are publicly traded and thus more transparent have better access to external financing 
(Holod & Peek, 2006). This means publicly traded banks are less likely to have as great 
a liquidity risk because they have an additional avenue in which they can access funds 
if needed.  
 
The Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) is the central bank for American banks. Its actions are 
designed to influence the supply and demand of money, impacting liquidity risk and 
creation. It takes actions specifically to manipulate the Federal Funds rate by influencing 
the amount of money supply in the banking system. This subsequently affects other 
rates in the market as well (Madura, 2007). The tightening of monetary policy by the 
FRB has significant effects on a banks liquidity risk and creation. When the FRB 
tightens monetary policy banks face a decline in the amount of deposits they hold 
(Holod & Peek, 2006). In particular, these deposits are the ones held for reserves in 
order to meet regulatory requirements as many banks do not hold excess reverses. If 
banks were holding excess reserves prior to the tightening of monetary policy it means 
they can no longer use these reserves to provide liquidity when such an opportunity 
presents itself. If not holding excess reserves, the banks themselves must raise 
additional capital. One way banks can do this is to sell liquid securities that they hold.  
Another option is to sell more illiquid assets, such as loans, which is not preferable to 
banks because they are forced to sell these assets at a reduced rate and face a 
potentially adverse effect on lending relations (Holod & Peek, 2006). Banks can also 
raise the cash by increasing the liability side of the balance sheet. This is a common 
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way in which banks deal with the tightening of monetary policy. They raise the funds 
mainly through uninsured large time deposits (Holod & Peek, 2006). Time deposits are 
deposits that not allowed to be withdrawn from the bank until a specific date (Madura, 
2007). These time deposits guarantee banks liquidity for a specific and measureable 
amount of time. The tightening of monetary policy means banks must raise additional 
cash or decrease the amount of excess cash they held, meaning they are unable to 
provide as much liquidity as before.  
 
The bailout policy by the FRB also greatly influences banks liquidity balance. Acharya, 
Shin and Yorulmazer target three different policies regarding bailouts and analyze their 
effects on liquidity management. The three different policies are providing liquidity 
support to failed banks, providing unconditional support to surviving banks, and 
providing conditional liquidity to surviving banks based on the percentage of liquid 
assets in their portfolio. They found that providing support to failed banks, or providing 
bailouts, will decrease a bank’s motivation to hold liquid assets. In this scenario banks 
that survive will have no opportunity to buy up the assets of a failed bank at the low fire 
sale prices because these banks won’t be allowed to fail. This will therefore decrease 
the reason for any bank to hold liquid assets because there is no strategic advantage in 
doing so. In the next scenario, the researchers found that when the FRB supports banks 
that survive unreservedly, this also decreases the motivation for banks to hold liquid 
assets. This is because support guarantees the banks that do survive the capital 
needed to purchase assets at fire sale prices and eliminates the need to worry about 
holding liquid assets that they can convert quickly to cash to do so. This effect is 
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especially true for large banks that are “too big to fail” because they need not worry 
about the possibility of failing either. The third policy examined concerns providing 
liquidity support to banks based on the amount of liquid assets they already hold in their 
portfolio. This policy increases a banks incentive to hold liquid assets. The banks 
holding the highest percentage of liquid assets will receive the most support and thus be 
able to purchase the most assets at fire sale prices. By providing bailouts or 
unconditional support the FRB increases the likelihood that banks will not hold liquid 
assets and therefore have higher liquidity risk. Similar research shows that banks have 
motivation to be illiquid if others are also illiquid, but liquid if others are also liquid 
(Ratnovski, 2007). The explanation for this is that if all banks are illiquid than support 
from the FRB is more likely. However if one bank is liquid and the other is not, then the 
support for the failing bank will be much less certain because the need to support the 
failing bank to keep the economy running smoothly will not be as urgent (Ratnovski, 
2007).   
 
As evidenced in the previously discussed literature, a banks’ liquidity tends to be 
counter-cyclic. This means that bank liquidity is low in normal economic times but high 
in tough economic times, such as crises. A study of U.K. banks from 1983-2003 found 
that this was accurate and that an approximately 1% increase in GDP lead to an 
approximately 2% decrease in banks liquidity (Aspachs, Nier, & Tiesset, 2004). This 
means that in order to ensure its own liquidity, banks do not provide liquidity to the 
market. This also means when many companies need it most banks do not act as a 
provider of liquidity.    
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Another interesting study examines not what banks do during a crises involving liquidity 
management but what banks have done before such crises. By studying five crises, 
three market crises and two banking crises, research suggests that there was either too 
much or too little liquidity creation before all of these crises. However, this idea 
remained non-conclusive (Berger & Bouwman, 2008). What was most interesting was 
the data surrounding the current economic crisis. Prior to and during the first portion of 
the current crisis, the data shows an abnormally high build-up of liquidity creation by 
banks. Berger and Bouwman refer to this as the “dark side” of liquidity. The idea states 
that banks may have created too much liquidity in the market and this is what led to 
such lax lending standards, too much available credit and too many credit lines. This 
idea is somewhat contradictory to the assumption that too little liquidity causes financial 
vulnerability and instead posits that too much liquidity can also cause financial 
vulnerability.   
III. Statement of Problem 
 
The problem with bank liquidity management is that when banks get it wrong, there can 
be drastic consequences for the economy. This can be seen today from the continuing 
effects of what started in 2007. The economy is still in a rut and although Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) has once again begun to pick up, unemployment remains at 
the extremely high level of 9.7% according to the most recent Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Report (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). A key issue to ensure progress has to be how 
to make sure banks successfully balance their liquidity management in order to be 
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stable and still provide the market with liquidity. Public policy makers will aim to continue 
strong national economic growth while keeping low unemployment and inflation. Banks 
themselves have a motive to ensure stability and also increase profits. Economies for 
years have struggled with liquidity risk. The sheer size and complexity of the modern 
economy increases the importance of this issue and this is all the more reason it needs 
to be carefully considered.  
IV. Possible solutions 
 
 
Since the crisis began banks have been under close scrutiny. Regulatory bodies and 
private industry have been observing banks’ behavior and have intervened to make 
suggestions on changes in best practices. They have also begun to evaluate how these 
banks are implementing changes.  
 
Internal risk management changes in banks are a key aspect of improving bank liquidity 
management in the years to come. The role of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is an 
important area targeted by many banks. Traditionally the monitoring of liquidity risk was 
under the umbrella of the treasury department of banks.  Banks plan on integrating the 
CRO and their team with the treasury department to monitor liquidity risk in the future 
(Senior Supervisors Group, 2009). This will improve oversight and coordination which 
was a problem because many banks before the crisis did not have a specific limit for or 
acceptable level of liquidity risk. This will change as banks need to clearly articulate to 
the entire organization what their strategy is regarding risk.  
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To fully achieve articulation, banks will need to make sure they are capable of 
measuring their liquidity risk. The lack of pertinent data on risks was cited by not only 
banks but many financial services firms as key to better liquidity and risk management 
(EYGM Limited, 2009). The information systems in place failed to recognize key risks. 
Without timely and accurate data, banks continue to struggle to understand the true 
depths of the liquidity risk and thus will be unable to know optimal level of liquidity 
creation.  
 
Hand in hand with more accurate data go more accurate risk models. These models will 
need to be able to better assess the difficulties the bank will face. This will mean more 
dramatic and gloomy assumptions about the banks conditions, the entire economy’s 
condition, and the length of time of the downturn (Economist, 2009).  As presented, a 
key aspect of a bank’s liquidity risk and creation are deposits. Therefore banks will need 
to test these deposits. This will be in order to determine which deposits are likely to 
remain at the bank and which ones will go elsewhere when economic conditions change 
(Senior Supervisors Group, 2009). Banks will need to dissect their business models in 
terms of sources of funding (EYGM Limited, 2009). As evidenced in the literature, banks 
could not even rely on financing that traditionally was near fail safe such as the Federal 
Funds market. Banks have rediscovered the strategic implications and beneficial 
impacts of larger liquidity cushions and most banks will need to increase these buffers.  
 
 
Banks alone cannot be expected to fully balance their liquidity risk and creation. They 
face a conflict of interest and unless given incentive to act otherwise will make sure their 
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own liquidity risk is taken care of before worrying about liquidity creation for the market. 
As discussed with the spiral effect there indeed may be incentive for banks to supply 
liquidity to halt the continued tightening and illiquidity in the market but this alone may 
not be enough. Public policy makers and regulators including the FRB must examine 
their policies to determine how to effectively make banks liquidity management achieve 
banks and markets needs.  
 
Public policy makers and regulators need to begin by reexamining existing policies and 
regulations. This will enable them to better understand where policies and regulations 
currently stand and the effectiveness of them. An immediate priority should be capital 
requirement. This clearly effects how much of a liquidity buffer banks are required to 
hold and also will influence how much liquidity a bank can create. A major problem 
identified in the literature is the counter-cyclic nature of liquidity holdings by banks and 
as a result, liquidity creation. A possible solution could include regulations that would 
incentivize banks to hold higher liquidity buffers in normal times. Instead of hoarding 
liquidity in times of crisis, this solution would incentivize banks to provide liquidity to the 
markets when illiquidity is a cause of stress. This could also help with the abnormal 
build up of liquidity prior to the crisis that was identified as a probable cause of the 
crisis. By holding higher liquidity in normal times this would decrease the amount of 
liquidity creation in the market and thus keep the economy from overheating. This is 
parallel with the philosophy of William McChesney Martin Jr. on the role of the FRB, “To 
take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going” and also would implement 
putting the punch bowl back when the party started to die.  
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A main policy for the FRB to assess is its bailout policy especially in light of the vast 
amount of current bailouts. The FRB’s actions will need to be closely scrutinized. 
Certain research points to bailout policy being a main cause of illiquidity in banks. The 
FRB should certainly consider the idea of providing support based on the amount of 
liquid assets a bank holds and weigh the effects this would have on banks. This could 
indeed incentivize banks to hold more liquid assets and address the issue of too much 
liquidity being counterproductive. 
 
 
It is a difficult balance between liquidity risk for a bank and liquidity creation for the 
markets. Banks will be naturally inclined to serve their own interest and this is why 
regulators must attempt to counter act this to keep the economy running smoothly.  
V. Conclusion 
 
 
Banks must change how to balance their liquidity risk and their role as liquidity 
providers, restructuring liquidity management. Liquidity risk exposes banks to financial 
hardship. Banks attempt to control liquidity risk factors by balancing cash inflows and 
outflows and some even hold liquidity cushions for strategic purposes. When crisis hits, 
banks limit their exposure to firms connected to the cause and these firms, including 
banks, will fare worse. Being exposed to too much liquidity risk can leave banks to face 
fleeing investors, depositor runs, ratings downgrades, and tougher financing. These 
consequences are what banks wish to avoid and why they implement policies to protect 
themselves from liquidity risk. This is also why when banks face the choice of lowering 
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their liquidity risk, especially in times of crisis, or providing liquidity to the market they 
will act to protect themselves first and foremost. Banks therefore tend to provide liquidity 
in counter-cyclic ways: too much when the economy is running hot and too little when 
the economy takes a turn for the worst. This tends to exacerbate the problem for both 
banks and the economy. Economies have seen this play out before and entities 
including banks and regulations have tried to learn from these crises. This has led to the 
establishment of regulations and internal policies to try to stem such crises. Regulators 
policies, such as bailing out failed banks and decisions about monetary policy, can 
greatly influence liquidity risk and creation. However, as evidenced by the current crisis, 
these steps seem to have failed to be up to the task of ensuring balance between the 
two. Banks should now return to more conservative policies and aim to improve cracks 
in their systems including improvement of information systems and more accurate 
models with more realistic assumptions. Regulators have their work cut out as well. 
They need to find a way to prevent the counter-cyclic trends of banks and ensure that 
actions by banks, although meant to secure their own liquidity, don’t actually make 
matters worse for all parties.  
VI. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
As banks and regulators change policies there will be a need to evaluate such policies 
before crisis strikes in an attempt to prevent or limit the intensity of crises. Empirical 
analyses of the regulators actions and there effects are future research possibilities.  
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